Thursday, April 29, 2010

The Principles of Battle Part 5


Ed Hadfield

The Principles of Battle Part 5
Tactical Coordination

As we look at the fireground tenants found in the Principles of Battle, the tenant of tactical coordination cannot be understated. In the dynamics of today fireground, we find the absolute need for tactical coordination to be a sharpened tool in the Incident Commanders tool box. Tactical coordination is not a new idea and definitely not completely understood by all fireground commanders. A review of any recent NIOSH report will clearly demonstrate the lack of understanding, or the lack of tactical consideration of coordinated fireground activities and events put into play by the Incident Commander.

In the absence of unlimited resources, the Incident Commander must prioritize the fireground into task and tactics which will provide the greatest benefit and outcome in the shortest timeframe with the least effort or strain on personnel. To do so the Incident Commander must accept that certain, undeniable risk must be taken in non- vital areas to enable him to achieve the superiority at the decisive place and time in an effort to gain the tactical advantage. Since agencies may find challenges in mustering adequate resources in a timely fashion to mount a tactical advantages offensive operation. Not to mention the difficulties establishing all the pre-built efficiency considerations necessary to complete the filling of all disciplines, the incident commander must use the concept of force multipliers and economy of force with tactical coordination while applying his will into the plan.

Time, however, tends to be our greatest enemy. Since we cannot push the pause button on the fireground we must act with swift and aggressive movement void of wasteful action. In the immortal words of Vince Lombardi, "The achievement of any organization is the combined effort of each individual". In other words, working together as a team in coordination on the fireground will result in the desired outcome of the Incident Commander. To do so, he clearly utilizes those resources on hand together for the greater good of the outcome. Hence, force multiplier as part of economy of force.

So, how do we apply these tasks in concert with our operations to be successful on the fireground? First, let's look into the most recent works of NIST. NIST showed in a landmark study that the crew size does make a difference in all aspects of the fireground tactical application. In that, with more personnel on scene the incident will stabilize much faster than with fewer personnel. This is no great surprise to the fire service but now it is science. With that said, many will still battle the need for appropriate staffing on the fireground and until such time as the entire American Fire Service has adequate staffing levels throughout, we must approach each incident with the mindset of coordinating actions which create a force multiplier in an effort to gain the tactical advantage in the shortest timeframe.

Let's suppose we have 6 to 8 personnel on scene of a working single family dwelling fire. The fire is content, compartment based fire, which has not spread to the structural elements of the occupancy. The indications from the 360 or DRA indicate the compartment has transitioned from the growth from the growth phase to the fully developed phase and is spreading internally within the structure. The Alpha Division shows heavy black smoke, under high velocity and turbulent I nature at, while the seat of origin of the compartment is located in the rear Bravo/Charlie Corner. Although one window is venting pressurized fire, the development within the enclosure continues to build in intensity. As you completed your 360 or DRA you observed a window on the Delta division in which you could visibly observe the curtains in the room. What does this scenario paint? What immediate actions would you take? What tactical coordination would you employ to gain the tactical advantage on this enclosure? And lastly, what considerations would you base your actions upon?

There is no perfect answer and no answer is any more correct than the next. Why, because many variables are in place based upon a number of unknown factors. However, we can surmise that the need to coordinate the three main components of (1). Establishing a strong command structure, (2) initiating an attack (3). Providing adequate and appropriate ventilation operations in unison will be the key to allowing a successful search to be conducted. The importance of coordinating all three main components will be the key to the success of the operations. Why? Easy, the strong command culture will enable the companies assigned to the tactical functions to simply apply their skill sets in a tactical and task driven function. Second, the initiation of fire attack to stop the rapid advancement of the enclosure fire will provide the platform for all other tactical functions and task. However, based upon the description of the incident, this must be coordinated with the ventilation operations to providing the working platform of efficient and effective operations on the interior of the structure. With that said, I have already utilized the first 6 personnel on scene and if I were to surmise two additional personnel were on scene for a total of 8 and based upon the indications of a potential area of refuge within the enclosure, those personnel would be in a search operations mode until a primary and secondary all-clear could be communicated.

As I said, I understand certain agencies follow procedures which may or may not allow them to operate in this fashion. However, as stated earlier, "The Incident Commander must accept that certain, undeniable risk must be taken in non- vital areas to enable him to achieve the superiority at the decisive place and time in an effort to gain the tactical advantage". In other words, the Incident Commander must fully understand the need to coordinate the available resources in a manner which provides the greatest benefit to the customer. The customer is first and foremost the citizen, followed by the internal customer the firefighter. We offer a higher degree of protection for both parties when we move away from assigning the limited resources which we have available to non-vital task based upon the presentation of the incident and move toward using resources which will force multiply the effects of one another when combined and coordinated as part of economy of force on the fireground.

With that…Sit back and enjoy the cuppa..

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Sunday, April 11, 2010

The Principles of Battle Part 4


Ed Hadfield
Sun, 04/11/2010 - 21:19

The Principles of Battle
Part 4
Simplicity + Economy of Force

It has been stated, "The dependence and reliance of technology as part of our fireground structure has proven to be deadly". No truer words have been spoken. Simplicity and the economy of force are and always will be the mainstay to effective fireground operations. Everyday some product manufacture is trying to sell the fire service on the next big thing. The $10,000.00 dollar item that will save the next 100 firefighters. Yet, what we fail to understand is the dependence on technology only takes away form the simplicity of teaching the mind to make those decisions which are appropriate upon the conditions and the resources available o the Incident Commander at the time.

Don't get me wrong, I enjoy the use of items which have allowed us to perform at a higher level, yet each item is a tool and the tool is as only good as the Craftsmen using the tool. A tool in the hands of an armature is only as good as the amateur's skill sets and knowledge. What I find to be absurd is spending thousands of dollars on a single piece of equipment with no training budget to give the realistic and appropriate training to provide mastery of use and skill of the tool. In simple words, tools don't make the fireground, firefighters with a high level of mastery in the skill and the Craft of Fire using the rights tools make the fireground.

I personally get a little cranky when some salesmen try to tell me how great this tool is when he or she has never used one at a fire. My first question is usually, "How well does it work without the battery"? followed by, "How well does it work when the environment is 500 degrees or its submerged in water"? Let's face it, technology is great but let's not get all fired up over the next great thing that everyone has to have and holds bake sales to get enough funds to line the manufactures pockets with.

So here is my spin on it. SIMPLCITY and ECONOMY OF FORCE. As an Incident Commander you must prepare ahead of time, clear, simple, uncomplicated and concise battle plans for the fireground. These battle plans are your standard SOP's, SOG's which are understood and communicated often. They are trained upon often and under constant evaluation. A good friend once said, "A plan is no good until it's been shot at". He would know he spent 20 years as a Navy SEAL.

The other aspect of this is the absolute understanding that under stress, simple will become complex. Simple plans reduce miscommunication and misunderstandings. So how do we go about this? Well it's simple, start with your primary needs and build your model or plan from there. You can't fight fire without an established water supply, and it does no good to pull a handline which is under gunned from the get go. Don't buy into urban myths about equipment and believe everything the sales guy tells you. Discover for yourself and get out there, put the equipment and more importantly your people though the test and if the equipment or your people are failing on the test plate, then you need to re-evaluate your plan and simplify your approach. Go back to step one and see were the breakdown has occurred. Don't go forward until you have resolved the issue.

In the immortal words of John Wooden, "We will practice the basics until they become habit, then we will practice them some more". Don't be afraid of adding some stress both physical and mental to the training evaluation. If they whine about the training being too hard then that's the first thing that needs to be addressed.

Finally, when it comes to economy of force, it's imperative to understand the importance of placing companies in positions of tactical advantage. Check box tactical operations are dangerous and non-effective for the customer. Just because the tactical worksheet has a box, doesn't mean it must be filled to be successful on the fireground. A recent fire illustrated this very situation, the incident called for two initial hand lines to be effective in stopping the rapid advancement of the interior fire. Yet, the I/C saw a need to assign a company to accountability. Hell, he only had two companies on scene! But the accountability was the second box on the chart, so it must be filled.

Let's face the facts, the sooner the fire goes out, the better result for the customers, both internal and external. Since most agencies are continuing to battle resource allocation, let's be judicious in our use of personnel and effectively assign them based upon need. The needs of the customers are always the same, put the fire out, search the building and make it as nice as possible before we leave. Take care of Ms. Smith and her kids or pets, take care of your people and rehab them and give them a good once over before they de-mob. Check all your equipment and tailboard the incident before you breakdown while it's fresh in everyone's mind. Tailboard sessions should occur at the individual level, company level and command level on all incidents before we breakdown.

With that…Sit back and enjoy the Cuppa
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Thursday, April 1, 2010

The Principles of Fireground Battle (Part 3)



Ed Hadfield
Fri, 02/12/2010 - 15:05
Principles of Fireground Battle (Part 3)

In the third part of our series, "The Principles of Fireground Battle", we look at the third tactical tenet of battle which is Offensive or as the Fire Service terms it, Pro-Active Advantage. The Pro-Active Advantage allows us to capture, retain and exploit the tactical advantages which we must solidify in order to accomplish our purpose.

Often we find fireground commanders place resources in a defensive advantage in the initial stages of the incident. With that, we find the reflex time to re-position resources to capture the advantage in offensive manners is lost, and the tactical advantage goes to the incident. This is typically a situation where the lack of understanding of the big picture vision is not clearly communicated or lost in the haze of battle. Using the OODA Loop, we understand the faster we move through the Loop, the better we are at gaining the tactical advantage.

The OODA Loop model was developed by Col. John Boyd, USAF (Ret). When Colonel John Boyd first introduced the OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) loop concept during the Korean War, he was referring to the ability possessed by fighter pilots that allowed them to succeed in combat. It is now used by many other Combat oriented organizations. I believe that in order to use the OODA Loop it must be used in conjunction with the Fireground Mindset for it to be effective on the Fireground.

What is Fireground mindset? For the Fireground commander this mindset is the conscious or subconscious willingness to assess the fireground based upon the presentation of facts. Utilizing the knowledge captured in the information exchange and the intelligence phase the fireground commander can rapidly make decisions to better accomplish the purpose and effectively operate in a position of Pro-Active Advantage. When engaging in fireground operations, this particular mindset, more often than not, will be the determining factor as to your success or failure, regardless of technical proficiency. Anybody can train in fireground command, but few have the technical and analytical skill to rapidly exercise judgment based upon the presentation of facts, therefore, they rely upon tactical work-sheets to guide them through the process, hence, we develop check-box command.

OODA Loop defined :( Fire Service Version)

Observation - Scan the Fireground and gather information and Intelligence from it and its operators. Conduct a DRA and capture all seven (7) yes, seven aspects of the structure. Process information and intelligence bases upon structure type, group and occupancy classification. Identify smoke process, fire conditions and structural integrity.

Orientation - Use the information to form a mental image of the circumstances. That is, synthesize the data into information/Intelligence. As more information/Intelligence is received, you 'deconstruct' old images and then 'create' new images. Note that different people require different levels of details to perceive an event. This is often based upon the Meyers theory of RPDM. Often, we imply that the reason certain Fireground Commanders cannot make good decisions, is that they are bad decisions makers, sort of like saying that the reason some people cannot drive is that they are bad drivers. However, the real reason most Fireground Commanders make bad decisions is that they often fail to place the information that they do have into its proper context. This is where 'Orientation' comes in. Orientation emphasizes the context in which events occur, so that we may facilitate our decisions and actions. That it, orientation helps to turn information into knowledge. And knowledge, not information, is the real predictor of making good decisions.

Decision - Consider options and select a subsequent course of action based upon the knowledge captured in the Orientation phase of the Loop. Do not make decisions based upon a check-the-box approach to fireground command. This will lead to improper actions down the road.

Action - Carry out the conceived decision. Once the result of the action is observed, you start over. Note that on the Fireground (or any complex incident), you want to cycle through the four steps faster and better than the incident, hence, it is a loop. This is the component that enables us to make the Pro-Active Advantage decision.

A few Tactical Guidelines which I have found to be true of Fireground Command and tactical fireground operations in general.
  • Firefighters will not rise to the occasion; they will always default to the level of training they have mastered.
  • Assign resources immediately based upon the presentation of facts and knowledge, not tactical worksheets.
  • Watch the fireground, the smoke, the fire and the building…It's the opponent.
  • Call for resources early, front load the incident.
  • Intelligence and Information are two different animals. Know the difference.
  • Don't fall back to the residential fire mentality on larger complex incidents. It will bite your ass!
  • The fireground is a complex series of conflict. Intelligent combat is the option
  • When you're doing OODA "loops" correctly; accuracy and speed improve together; they don't trade off.
Sit back and enjoy the Cuppa!!
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The Principles of Fireground Battle (Part 2)


Ed Hadfield

In part two (2) of Principles of Fireground Battle, we will discuss and give insight into the second of the nine (9) tenets of battle. The second tenet in the original works from General Fuller would be Objective. Yet, as we take into consideration the Fire Service terms of those particular tents we capture Objective in the term of Strategy/Mission of Purpose.

In previous articles I have spoken to Mission of Purpose and have clearly indicated the firm belief in the accepted three primary functions of the Fire Service. They are and remain, Life Safety, Incident Stabilization and Property Conservation. These three tenets speak to our Mission of Purpose on the fireground, and in all other All-Risk functions we have accepted as part of our growing responsibility as the Thin Red Line of defense and the protectors of our community and abroad. Do not take our Mission of Purpose lightly, we the American Fire Service where some of the first American Forces into Haiti following the devastating earthquake. It was the American Fire Service who within a matter of 48 hours was mobilized and airborne to help find those buried under the masses of rubble. In this incident it was the ICS (NIMS) system in place and operable within moments of the first Task Force members phone ringing telling them of the deployment. My point here is to clearly demonstrate the magnitude of Mission of Purpose. Whether it a Single Family Dwelling Fire or a multiple Task Force response to another country, the tenets of battle remain the same, Life Safety, Incident Stabilization, Property Conservation, I.E. Mission of Purpose.

So why is it, if this principle of Fireground Battle seems so apparent and simple, then why is it so messed up so often on the fireground? Why does it seem that Primary Search is an afterthought? Why is ventilation considered a support function and not part of the primary attack component to the fireground? Why is ICS thrown out like the baby with the bath water for some newfound fad of hybrid strategy concepts somebody is peddling to make a buck? To tell you the truth, I really don't know, because it is so foreign to my thought process that I really can't comprehend why these things occur, but I can tell you they do!

So here it is plan and simple, at least in my mind. First, why do people call the fire department? Typically it is due to the fact that they can think of nobody else to solve their problem. Therefore, we suddenly become the experts in all fields and endeavors, hence All-Risk or as I like to think All-Do. In the case of a structure fire or fireground battle, they call for three primary purposes. 1. Save their lives or the lives of someone in the path of the fire. Sounds simple enough, Life Safety! Next, put the fire out and stop it from spreading. Again, pretty simple, Incident Stabilization. Third, stop the destruction of their personal belonging due to the hazardous affects of the fire. Hummm, sounds a lot like Property Conservation.

OK, so we accept that as our Strategy/Mission of Purpose, so how do we accomplish it in simple term. Easy, ever hear someone say, "Just put the fire out and the problem goes away"? Well they are right. A good friend of mine happens to spend a great deal of time in a foreign country keeping bad people from doing further bad things to the United States. His goal is simple. First, the goal of any operations is mission first, men or me are second. Now I know some will say that's wrong, well, I disagree. The American Fire Service is a volunteer organization, no matter if you receive compensation (Paid) or not (Volunteer), nobody and I mean nobody is forced to accept the hazards of this noble profession. With that said, you accept the same hazards as our brothers and sisters in Law Enforcement and the Military. You have accepted the fact that you are willing to lay down your life for the life of another. Failure to accept that responsibility is dereliction of duty and a dishonor to those you have sworn to protect.

Next, in simple terms, rapidly determine which of the three primary strategy modes you are in. Is it Life Safety? Well, unless someone is standing outside with all of their loved ones within arms reach telling you everyone is out, then the answer is yes. I don't buy into this notion that you have to have someone outside yelling," My family, my family" frantically pointing to the burning structure to put you into the life safety mode. Remember, people leave, no run, from burning buildings. Of course the occupancy group and type may play a role into the decision as well.

Further, the best practice has proven to be placement of the correct size hand line, with the correct ability to flow based upon involvement and resources. Where would that placement be? Between the fire and the potential victims or between the burned and the unburned. Pretty darn simple and yet, greatly effective.

To accomplish, we may have to perform functions on the fireground which are part of the primary fire attack component. These functions are not supportive, they are primary in nature due to what is presenting at the time. Those would include but not limited to, Softening the Structure or Ventilations Operations. Remember, if we cant get in/out or make the fire due to extreme fire conditions, we can move or forces forward in an attempt to conduct search operations.

Next we must search! The Mission in a Life Safety Mode is Search, we must have a Primary Search accomplished before we shift modes and a Secondary done immediately after the Primary is called. Until you conduct both the primary and secondary search component, you are still in the Life Safety mode, which is the most dangerous of all modes. This is not to say we cannot attempt to achieve Incident Stabilization or Property Conservation in conjunction with the Life Safety Mode, however, our primary mission is still Life Safety and that includes our own personnel. Supportive functions must be secondary to placement of resources in the achievement of the Life Safety Mode needs.

Lastly, to achieve this we must have a Command Structure. This is the simplest of all items. It's the use of ICS as a command structure to facilitate all firegound functions. ICS works, whether it is a medical aid or sending task force to Haiti, ICS works. Placing personnel in task, tactical or strategic functions under the guide of groups, divisions or as big a branches will make the fireground safer, more effective and greatly more organized. Read any NIOSH report and the #1 reason bad things happen on the fireground is the failure, lack of or miss-use of ICS. There are some that say ICS only needs to be used on the big incidents. I totally disagree. ICS used on ALL incidents no matter what the type or size will facilitate a better functioning use and proper development of ICS principles throughout your company and the organization. And what ever you do, stick to the foundation and the principles of ICS, don't go wacko and develop some hybrid version, slap a label on it and peddle it on the streets under a better way. ICS or its original father (Firescope) has proven to work on All-Risk incidents over the years. It literally had bullets shot at it. The 1992 Los Angeles Riots are a prime example of functional Area Command Structure with the bullets flying. Again, my good friend reminds me, the best plan is simple, easy to understand, and can withstand having bullets shot at it. Well folks, ICS is that plan and failure to understand, adopt, and use it will give you hemorrhoids.

With that said, sit back and enjoy the Cuppa. Till next time, Roget that!!

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The Principles of Fireground Battle (Part 1)




Ed Hadfield
Sun, 01/17/2010 - 15:25

In 1912 British Major General J.F.C. Fuller published nine tenets known as, "The Principles of War". In 1921 the United States Army published discussion papers on Fullers works. In 2010, almost 100 years later it is important for the Fire Service to take the time tested lessons and absolute battled tested tenets to heart, while understanding how these tenets create effective Fireground strategies.

Fuller's original tenets include; Maneuver, Objective, Offensive, Simplicity, Economy of Force, Mass, Unity of Command, Surprise and Security. These have been and continue to be referred to in military circles as MOOSMUSS. For the fire service to understand and utilize these tenets, we will refer in terms of our understanding. They are:

Original Terms Fire Service Terms

Maneuver = Placement & Positioning

Objective = Strategy (Mission of Purpose)

Offensive = Pro-Active Advantage

Simplicity = Simplicity

Economy of Force = Resource Allocation

Mass = Tactical Coordination

Unity of Command = Command Structure

Surprise = Support Functions

Security = Safe Fireground Behaviors

To better understand how these battle tested tenets create more effective Fireground behaviors, we will address them one by one discussing the importance of each function to capture the whole picture of those Critical Fireground Factors.

Maneuver = Placement/Positioning of Personnel and Apparatus:

Often we find this concept is an afterthought, or not given the importance it should on the Fireground. This is the baseline of fundamental Fireground operations. Taken from the tactical advantage standpoint, all operations must have a base. Our base is the apparatus placement and initial personnel deployment to engage the firefight. It takes a number of items to engage in a firefight, yet, without water, and equipment all the personnel n the world will not put the fire out. Simply stated, apparatus and personnel must be placed (Spotted/Positioned) to gain the greatest tactical advantage. Take a simple single family dwelling fire. Some organizations which are afforded the opportunity to have Truck Companies respond as part of the first alarm assignment, continually neglect effective truck company placement. Often the excuse and I do mean excuse is this type of fire does not require the aerial device. Great observation! However, the remaining ground ladder packaging and tool assortment assigned to the truck is critical to change the behavior of the fire in a swift effort to allow the Engine Companies the opportunity to rapidly engage in the firefight and aggressively search the occupancy for victim while confining the fires origin through the excellence of extension and exposure control. If the first arriving Engine Company announced the location in which they were laying a water supply from, (i.e. Engine 1 laying a 4" from 1313 Mockingbird Lane) this would allow the Truck Officer the opportunity to identify if they should approach from the opposite direction. Often, laying the 4" down the street to the fire will block out all other apparatus and remove tactical placement for the Truck. If the Engine 1 Officer recognizes this, he should pull short of the occupancy and leave the front of the structure for the Truck, since the Truck will be responding from the opposite direction. I realize this cannot always occur, but it gives us the opportunity t o address these issues. On the other hand, if laying into the fire will not block additional responding companies out, i.e. if the hydrant is on the same side of the street as the fire. Then the Engine 1 Officer should pull long on the fire and leave the front of the structure for the Truck. Another advantage to announcing to incoming units which hydrant you are laying in from, is it identifies that you have captured a water supply and do not require the second in company to provide you with that water supply. Remember, as a first arriving Engine Company you have either captured water supply (Laid In), are getting a water supply (Engineer is hand-jacking) or need a water supply (Second Due bring water in). Lastly, we will explore more of the tactical advantage of placement of the apparatus design. First Engine Companies have four sides, and each design feature is based upon a number of factors. Yet, for sake of argument, let's take an L-Shaped strip mall fire with the unit in the direct middle of the long part of the L involved. Placement of the Engine Company should be at a 45 degree angle to the involved unit with the rear 2 ½" hose bed at a tactical advantage to protect the largest exposure of the occupancy. This tactic allows for the most effective use of both cross-lays and the ability to rapidly place in service large hand lines, or branch off into multiple lines from the 2 ½". It also gives the Engineer the best vantage point to conduct operations and effectively operate as the initial safety officer recognizing Fireground hazards and setbacks which could hinder operations. Should the fire place companies in d a reactive mode and defensive operations need to be conducted, the Engine placement is at a tactical advantage to accept additional water supply and utilize the wagon battery (deck-gun). These are just a few of the tactical advantages which should be considered as part of the initial placement of apparatus on the Fireground. We will continue to discuss additional thought sand considerations in the next blog.

Until then...Sit back and enjoy the Cuppa!!!
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The Science of Command and The Commander




Ed Hadfield
Thu, 12/24/2009 - 15:52

The Science of Command and the Commander


It is interesting to discuss the "Art" of Command as opposed to the "Science" of Command. If one was to believe Command is an art, then the Incident Commander shall be an artist. Thus, he would have inherent natural talents which make him a Commander. Yet, if one accepted the belief that command is in fact a science we would understand that all commanders have the ability to become functional at the level of command.

It must be understood that artist are gifted at their given craft. No matter how hard I train, study, learn and perform I do not have the God given talents to become a singer. Although, my children haven't figured that out and they think I'm the next Johnny Cash (At least that's what I tell them). On the other hand, one can take an average Fire Officer and provide them with the training, study, development and opportunity to greatly increase their understanding and abilities in the Craft of Command and we can in turn have a highly functional Incident Commander. Why? Simply, Command is a science with very basic principles and underlying foundation of elements in which most all those who desire can with expanded (not limited) educational process operate at a highly functional level. Just as scientists understand the basic principles of science, so should the Incident Commander.

Command Doctrine:

An Incident is an event that may cause or causes a crisis. A Crisis is an emotionally stressful event or given situation involving an abrupt and decisive change. Typically we as humans see a crisis as bad and negative. Yet, a crisis is only something that may turn out to be bad. This is dependant on a number of basic foundational elements. One thing is a given, a crisis will almost never get better without some type of intervention and even with intervention the outcome is uncertain.

So we know an incident causes a crisis. Particular to an incident is the fireground, which is a Conflict. One would ask, "Why is it a conflict?" Because a conflict is any situation in which there is an irreconcilable battle of opposing wills. The fireground is a classic illustration of conflict, where the Incident Commander is imposing his will upon that of the incident and the fireground.

When we look into the elements of crisis, we have identified through study that five (5) common characteristics of the crisis are shared. Confusion plays an important part of the overall understanding for the Incident Commander. There is always a lack of reliable information and what is available is usually incomplete, ambiguous and at times, conflicting. Although it is the primary goal of the Incident Commander to assure tthe confusion is reduced to increase the overall effectiveness of the tactical operations on the fireground. This uncertainty requires the Incident Commander to make strategic and tactical decisions based upon the probabilities of the outcome for which he is invariably missing accurate and timely information. Keep in mind, decisions will and must be made based upon missing, incomplete and contradictory information.

The Fog of Battle is a term used to describe the level of ambiguity in situational awareness experienced by the Incident Commander on the fireground. The term seeks to capture the uncertainty regarding Incident Command capability, fireground capability, and fireground intent during an operation. This fog is that condition which prohibits the Incident Commander from obtaining the needed information in a timely fashion and implement action based upon that information in relevant time to control the incident. The Incident Commander must fully understand and accept that risk is a part of the situation and the elimination of all risk is never possible. Only through capturing timely and accurate information can the Incident Commander reduce risk and factor in the uncontrollable element of chance.

Incident commanders must full capture the elements of Chance. While risk in inherent and part of the overall equation, chance cannot reasonably be foreseen and while we have little if any control in these uncontrollable factors, we must understand how chance affects our decions process. When we speak of risk management models, we must quantify the difference between risk and chance. More often than not, those attempting to element risk are in fact attempting to eliminate chance and thus, they end up in Command Paralysis. Command Paralysis is all too common and is a typical response to the Check-Box approach to tactical situation in which Friction occurs.

Friction is those overwhelming forces that resist all action. It makes the simple difficult and the difficult overwhelmingly impossible. Typically, one will find friction with Incident Commanders who lack wisdom and experience and are predisposed to the use of check-box strategic and tactical incident command. When the Incident Commander is overwhelmed by the amount of risk involved in the incident, or when chance favors the fire, these type Incident Commanders will suffer from self-induced indecision, fear based tactical approaches, and lack of clearly defining incident objectives a stated goals.

Incidents do not wait for the Incident Commander to make decision; the incident is Time Competitive and is always seeking the advantage. In fact, in the beginning stages of all fireground operations, the fireground as distinct advantage and has a time competitive advantage over the personnel responding. This is why the statement of Gen. George S. Patton rings true. Gen Patton was quoted as saying, "A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week."

Speed, violence and overwhelming resources are the key elements to re-capturing the time competitive advantage to the Incident Commanders side. It is important for the Incident Commander to fully appreciate the aspect being in a time competitive advantage.

The concept of Initiative refers to the freedom to make decisions and act upon those decisions without being urged to do so. An Incident Commander who has the initiate causes the fire to be reactive and actions of mitigation / suppression of fireground setbacks and hazards occur, thus reducing the risk profile to personnel. An implied objective and goal of every fireground operations is to gain tactical initiative.

In summary, because all incidents are always human activities and the fireground is dynamic, time competitive and dangerous, the basic and fundamental characteristics of on-command realistic training, positive experience, established high levels of maturity, wisdom and a strong doctrine of discipline will deeply affect all individual and group efforts.

Any command concept or doctrine that attempts to reduce strategy and tactics to technology, equipment, theoretical concepts and risk avoidance, neglects the impact of the human will and influence of conducting operations and is therefore inherently flawed from the get go. It is only through a strong, swift, and coordinated efforts can the force of the fire be overcome.

Enjoy the Cuppa……

Special thank to Lt. Sid Heal
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